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Na·i"ve and Artfully Simple Models 
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Naval Postgraduate School, whughes@nps.edu 
mong the things we teach 
our students in the Joint 
Campaign Analysis course 
at the Naval Postgraduate 
School is that warfare mod­
els-whether mathematical, 
simulations, or wargames-usually go 
through an evolution. The first ver-
sion is a na'fve attempt to represent 
the essence of the phenomenon it 
represents. For example, at the tacti­
cal level, perhaps combat power is 
represented by some basic form of 
Lanchester equations. At the campaign 
(or operational) level, the model might 
show how much combat potential can 
be delivered at what rate by our side 
and the enemy at an expected scene 
of conflict, if there is no attrition en 
route and loading/unloading times are 
ignored. Whatever the simple structure 
may be, it will be challenged, additional 
features will be added, and the model 
will become more and more encum­
bered with efforts to make it more "re­
alistic." When the model threatens to 
sink from its own components, the art­
ful analyst will ask, do we have inputs 
for all its hundreds of variables, and 
are they accurate enough to justify the 
model's pseudo-comprehensiveness? 
Above all, what factors seem to drive 
the results? The artful analyst then 
applies Occam's razor and shaves the 
model to an essence with which to 
communicate results and draw useful 
conclusions. At this point the analyst 
has arrived at an artfully elegant model 
that is sophisticated in its simplicity 
and utility. 
A campaign is an intricate series of 
activities by many entities, widely 
distributed. Campaign analysis is too 
much an art form to make predic­
tions. But when the artful analyst 
does the work well the model will help 
decision-makers make better choices, 
avoid the worst mistakes, and add 
quantitative rigor to their preconcep­
tions-contingent on the decision­
makers themselves knowing the 
power and limitations of analysis. 
Observe that I have asserted that 
model-based analysis is an IF-THEN 
statement, but (as Clayton Thomas 
pointed out many years ago) on the IF 
side are two components-the model 
and the inputs that go into it. Model 
and inputs are exercised in some 
kind of analytical process, produc-
ing a THEN statement, which are the 
results. To the extent that the model is 
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complete and the inputs are accurate, 
the results will be predictions. But no 
model can be complete in describing 
a campaign, and the inputs will always 
be obscured by the fog of war. 
The Evolution of Campaign 
Analysis Tools 
In class we give our students a few 
examples of success stories in artful 
mathematical modeling, and show 
how the results can be enriched later 
by simulations and wargames. In 
each class the students do a three­
week "mini-study," representative 
of a "rapid response analysis" so 
frequently needed both in the Pen­
tagon and on afloat staffs at war. We 
call them "overnight" analysis but it is 
more like a three-day response to an 
important question: it takes one day 
to figure out how quantitative work 
can help, one day to do the analysis, 
and one day to recover from your 
mistakes or enrich the work! 
The joint campaign analysis course 
has evolved over the years. Through­
out the 1980s the problems were not 
very ambitious because the available 
analytical tools were rudimentary. 
Nevertheless, the results were often 
rich with insights. For example, the 
students examined the likely outcome 
of the Falklands War in 1982 before 
the fighting began. I thought then and 
still believe that if the Argentines had 
done a campaign analysis no more 
complicated than the quick and in 
some ways superficial work of my 
students, Argentina would have won 
the war. By the year 2000 we could 
ask more complicated questions, 
because the basic tools were better. 
Excel spreadsheets allowed them to 
do many runs with many variations. 
Google Earth allowed them to inspect 
terrain in great detail at scenes of 
action; for example, individual Spratly 
Islands, a segment the Vietnam coast, 
or the Natuna archipelago just south 
of China's "dotted red line." And 
very communicative slides could be 
produced quickly with PowerPoint. 
The students need to be taught that 
PowerPoint communication is the art 
of not overloading the presentation 
with extraneous photographs, and to 
never, never show raw results from 
spreadsheets! Their models are not as 
complicated as defense contractors 
are wont to produce, and the inputs 
are few enough that everyone knows 
their cause-to-effect relationships. 
In short, our students give focused 
insights, elegant and often persuasive. 
The Evolution of Campaign 
Analysis Topics 
Meanwhile the campaign topics 
metamorphosed. Emphasis on NATO 
and the Atlantic shifted in the early 
1990s to coastal operations, mostly 
for projection of power and influence 
around the world. The 1990s analysis 
entailed radically different models and 
inputs, with emphasis on the littorals 
and Southwest Asia. Another dramatic 
shift came in 2001 after the terrorist 
attacks. We had to invent new tools 
for antiterrorist analysis, eschewing 
elegant-looking but unhelpful figures 
like the purportedly comprehensive 
"bird 's nest" diagram of "all" inter-
relationships involved in peacemak-
ing operations. We studied antipiracy 
campaigns and learned that "if you 
can find 'em you can kill 'em." 
Simultaneously we anticipated the rise 
of China and assigned studies of PRC 
vulnerabilities at sea in the Western 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. We asked 
the students to estimate the effective-
ness of submarines and small deadly 
missile corvettes to block their trade 
and create a no man's land in the China 
Seas where all surface ships could be 
put at risk with our own area-denial 
strategy. By the time China began 
to seize islands in the Paracels and 
Spratly's, make claims in the vicinity of 
the Senkaku Islands, and assert owner-
ship of the sea inside the "dotted red 
line," we were assigning complicated 
cases in which the PLA invaded Pala-
wan or Natuna Besar Island. Alterna-
tively, we anticipated these moves and, 
with the support of the Philippine or 
Indonesian governments, explored how 
swiftly we could establish a defensive 
posture with Marines in the island, air 
cover from carriers or land bases, and 
submarines or a flotilla of small missile 
ships to interdict Chinese amphibious 
task forces. The many advantages of 
defending rather than retaking an island 
stood out starkly and quantitatively. 
The Rewards 
In all these efforts we told the stu-
dents we were aiming at 80 percent 
solutions from which can flow two 
things. First, if this is an operational 
scenario the staff can start designing 
a workable operation order. Second, 
when time permits there can and 
should be further refinements, includ-
ing wargames and simulations. In a 
word, neither we nor the students 
know whether they are working with 
na"fve or artfully simple models. We 
only know we don't have time to ex-
plore all possible refinements. 
IN TOUCH 
My purpose here is not to describe 
scenarios we thought were likely but 
scenarios that tested the students' 
ability to help guide decision-mak-
ers-e.g., PACOM and the JCS-to-
ward better campaign decisions in 
well-defined and ever-more compli-
cated campaigns. 
But the modern tools and new kinds 
of campaign problems did not lead to 
more complicated models. The tools 
helped to explore more variations, 
probe the geography, and communi-
cate which side-us or them-has the 
more attractive options, and ways and 
means to give us more choices and 
reduce the enemy's choices. Modern 
analytic tools make it easier to enrich 
understanding without using opaque 
mathematical models and simulations. 
Conclusions 
The tools with which to conduct 
richer campaign analyses have come 
a long way since the 1980s and 
empower us to look at highly compli-
cated scenarios. 
Today's tools should not be seen as 
leading to more "realistic" analysis 
with comprehensive simulations. 
When the need for a decision in the 
Pentagon or on a fleet staff is urgent 
and time is limited, the new tools add 
flexibility and the means to examine 
more variations. But useful campaign 
analysis remains as much art as sci-
ence and the quantitative results are, 
as before, more for precise commu-
nication than for prediction. The goal 
is still to exercise an artfully simple 
model restricted to the most important 
factors that usually drive the results. 
For example, a model showing the 
enormous difference between being 
first or second at the scene of action, 
or the stark advantage of firing our 
missiles effectively before the enemy 
can respond, and why doing that can 
reduce our own losses. 
PHALANX - SEPTEMBER 2013 51 
IN TOUCH 
Artfully simple models are more 
adaptable, or when circumstances 
change, quickly replaceable. 
Artfully simple models communicate 
what the analyst has and has not 
represented to the decision-maker, so 
the latter is better able to add his or 
her own unquantifiables in a sophisti-
cated way. 
I write these things while hap-
pily existing in NPS's Department of 
Operations Research, which is inter-
nationally renowned for cutting-edge 
development of intricate tools for 
data mining, optimization, statistical 
rigor, and sophisticated applications 
of game theory. My department also 
exploits the structuring and transfer 
of data for easy access, of which the 
Web and Wikipedia's many capa-
bilities are famous, public examples. 
Sometimes the power of modern 
computing is necessary and leads 
to remarkable success stories. I can 
think of military applications by our 
faculty and students in logistics, al-
location of search effort, and many 
others. By contrast, my message is 
intended to temper enthusiasm for 
ever-more advanced applications of 
computing power. In campaign analy-
sis at least, artfully simple models are 
very rewarding.a Although sources 
of data have expanded, that doesn't 
mean input data at the campaign 
level can be accurate. The truism, "all 
combat data is dirty," is just as true as 
in the past. 
Finally, there will always be Black 
Swans-important events that cannot 
be foreseen-to confound the best 
that the analyst-decision-maker team 
can achieve. Neither art, nor science, 
nor wisdom will eliminate the fog of 
war. The famous saying goes, "Some-
thing must be left to chance," but art-
fully simple models with quantitative 
results improve our chances. As one 
of Damon Runyon's New York City 
crooked gamblers said after the horse 
he'd bet on stumbled and lost a race 
he had paid big bucks to fix, "Well, the 
race is not always to the swift, or the 
battle to the strong ... but that's the 
way to bet." 9 
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Note 
• A favorite essay published in Naval 
Research Logistics by [Professor] T. W. 
Lucas and [Lt] J. E. McGunnigle is "When 
is Model Complexity Too Much? Illustrat-
ing the Benefits of Simple Models with 
Hughes' Salvo Equations." The subject 
is combat analysis instead of campaign 
analysis, but many Lucas-McGunnigal 






ESSENTIAL SKILLS FOR 
ANALYTICS PROFESSIONALS 
Topic areas to be covered in 
this course include: 
» Problem Framing 
» Developing the Work Plan 
» Modeling 
» Testing 
» Presenting Results 
» Impact Assessment 
This course will be held 
Sept. 26-27, 2013, in Redwood City, CA 
Nov. 7-8, 2013, in Washington, DC 
Learn more about these 
courses at: 
informs.org/continuinged 
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INFORMS Continuing Education 
program will offer its first two courses 
this fall. These intensive, two-day, in-
person courses will provide analytical 
professionals with key skills, tools, and 
methods that can be implemented 
immediately in a work environment. 
DATA EXPLORATION 
& VISUALIZATION 
This course will address topics such as: 
» Accessing Data 
» Understanding Raw Data 
» Cleaning & Transforming Data 
» Exploring & Visualizing Data 
» Dimension Reduction 
This course will be held 
Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2013, in Redwood City, CA 
Oct. 3-4, 2013, in Minneapolis, MN 
